一、讲座主题：Persuasion with Two-Sided Private Information

二、主讲人：陈斌

陈斌，华中科技大学教授、博导，数字经济研究中心主任，入选国家级青年人才项目。2010年在香港大学经济与金融学院取得博士学位（PhD）。主要从事信息经济学、产业经济学的研究。十余篇英文论文发表在Economic Journal、Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、International Journal of Industrial Organization、Management Science等国际期刊，以及2篇发表在《经济研究》。

三、主要内容：

A principal wants to influence the action of an agent who has a private type but is uncertain about a payoff-relevant state. In an interim stage, the principal receives a private signal about the state, but she is unable to credibly disclose it without the use of payments. By committing to a menu of message-contingent payments, the principal can implement an information disclosure policy which is either tailored to the agent's report of his type or not. We find that discriminatory disclosure maximizes the principal's payoff if revealing information to the agent who derives a low gain from the information results in a large increase in the principal's expected payment or a large loss in the principal's expected utility.

四、时间：2022年11月17日10:30-12:00

五、地点：腾讯会议843-111-067 密码：221117