一、讲座主题：Nested Tullock Contests with Nonmonotone Prizes

二、主讲人：周立学，经济学博士，必赢线路检测中心副研究员。研究方向为微观经济理论。研究成果发表于Games and Economic

Behavior, Journal of Economic and Behavior Organization等期刊。                            

三、主要内容：This paper demonstrates the possibility of a symmetric “binary-action mixed-strategy equilibrium” in the nested Tullock contest model (Clark and Riis, 1996, 1998b) with multiple nonmonotone prizes. In this symmetric equi- librium, every player adopts the same mixed strategy: Each exerts zero effort with some probability and a constant positive effort otherwise. This new type of equilibrium can coexist with the pure-strategy equilibria established in the literature; it may exist even when those pure-strategy equilibria do not. The coexisting (mixed and pure-strategy) equilibria may induce different levels of effort supply.                                

四、时间：2022年10月13日12:00-13:00

五、地点：腾讯会议192-434-008  密码：1013