一、报告题目：

Job Offer Design: The Role of Acceptance Deadline

二、报告人：

赵昕，澳大利亚悉尼科技大学经济系研究员

三、报告时间：

2018年06月21日（周四）下午 03:00-05:00

四、报告地点：

知新楼B423

五、报告人简介：

赵昕，澳大利亚悉尼科技大学经济系研究员，多伦多大学经济学博士。主要研究领域为微观经济学与政治经济学。曾在《Journal of Regulatory Economics》《Review of International Economics》《Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting and Economics》等国际期刊发表文章。

六、报告摘要：

This paper examines the impact of the deadline that an employer chooses for its preferred job candidate to accept its job offer on the recruiting outcome. The choice of acceptance deadline depends on the quality of the employer, the secondary candidate of the employer, and the salary (or remuneration package) provided in the job offer. If the secondary candidate of an employer is not sufficiently attractive, the acceptance deadline of the employer's job offer is decreasing in its quality. If the secondary is attractive enough, the relationship between the acceptance deadline and the quality of the employer is not monotonic; both low quality and high quality employers choose to send exploding offers, which give their preferred job candidates no time of consideration. Increasing the salary specified in the offer may induce an employer to choose a longer acceptance deadline. That is, the salary does not necessarily substitute the role of the acceptance deadline in recruitment. However, if we allow an employer to customize its job offer to screen candidates having privately informed market prospects, the salary and the acceptance deadline are substitutes. The optimal design of job offer exhibits the features of ``bonus-for-early-acceptance" mechanism, under which the candidate receives a salary bonus if he accepts the offer immediately, and the bonus decreases with the time of making the acceptance decision until the offer expires at a predetermined date.

七、主办单位：

必赢线路检测中心